A Test Case for the World Bank by Bradlow, Daniel D
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
1996 
A Test Case for the World Bank 
Daniel D. Bradlow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
A TEST CASE FOR THE WORLD BANK
Daniel D. Bradlow'
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors (the Board)
established a three-member Inspection Panel (the Panel).' The Panel has
the power to investigate complaints received from private parties, alleg-
ing that the Bank failed to act in conformity with its operating rules and
procedures.2 It also has the authority to make recommendations to the
Board about which complaints to investigate, as well as the power to
make findings based on its investigations.3 In all cases, the Board re-
tains final decision making power." The Bank makes available to the
public the requests for investigation, the Panel's recommendations and
reports, and the Board's decisions The Panel opened for business in
September 1994.
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
1. The World Inspection Panel, Res. 93-10, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, Res. 93-6, International Development Association (Sept. 22, 1993)
[hereinafter Resolution].
2. Id; see The Inspection Panel Operating Procedures 4-5 (Aug. 19, 1994)
[hereinafter Operating Procedures] (stating that the Panel serves as an independent
forum for adversely affected people to request that the Bank act in accordance with
its policies and procedures); see also Res. No. 93-10 (Res. No. IDA 93-6), Sept. 22,
1993, reprinted in Operating Procedures, supra, Annex 1, at 22 (establishing the In-
spection Panel).
3. Resolution, supra note 1; see Operating Procedures at 5-6 (noting that during
the preliminary review period, the Panel will gather information and then make a
recommendation on whether the matter warrants an investigation).
4. Resolution, supra note 1; see Operating Procedures, supra note 2, at 16
(stating that the decision whether to accept or reject the Panel's recommendation lies
with the Board).
5. Resolution, supra note 1; see Operating Procedures, supra note 2, at 16-17
(noting that the Bank will make a request available to the public after consideration
by the Executive Directors).
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The Board's decision has international legal significance. The Panel is
the first forum in which private parties can seek to hold international
organizations directly accountable for their actions.6 Given the broad
scope of the Bank's operations, the Panel has the potential to influence
the evolution of international human rights, environmental, and admin-
istrative law. The Bank's response to, and the Panel's treatment of, the
first request for investigation is therefore of interest to international
lawyers.
The Panel received the first request for an investigation in October
1994.' The request involved the design of the proposed Arun III Hydro-
electric Project in Nepal.8 This Request culminated in a Panel investiga-
tion of those specific aspects of the Bank's conduct that were allegedly
not in compliance with the Bank's operating rules and procedures.9 Fol-
lowing the completion of the Panel's investigation, but before a final
decision by the Board, the President of the Bank announced that the
Bank was withdrawing its offer to fund the project."°
The conclusion of the Panel's first case offers a useful opportunity to
assess the Panel's contribution towards improving the Bank's account-
ability to the intended beneficiaries of its operations, to the efficacy of
those operations, and to international law. In order to make this assess-
ment, this paper will first describe the Panel. It will then discuss the
6. Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complainants:
The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553 (1994); Daniel
D. Bradlow & S. Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's New Inspection Panel: A
Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order, 54 ZAoRV
392 (1994); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994).
7. Since then, the Panel has received three additional requests. See Request for
Inspection: Tanzania Power VI Project, Request No. 95/2 (June 16, 1995) [hereinafter
Tanzania Request]; Request for Inspection: Brazil Rondonia Natural Resources Man-
agement Project, Request No. RQ 95/3 (June 19, 1995) [hereinafter Rondonia Re-
quest]; Request for Inspection: Ethiopia (Letter from the Pappasinos family, March 29,
1995) (not registered with the Inspection Panel; available from the Center for Interna-
tional Environmental Law (CIEL)) [hereinafter Ethiopia Request].
8. See Arun Concerned Group, Request for Investigation, October 24, 1994
[hereinafter Request] (copies available at the World Bank's Public Information Center)
(objecting to the dam project and claiming that the Bank plans to lend money for a
dam violated Bank policies on environmental assessment).
9. See id. (alleging that the Bank violated its internal policies and procedures).
10. Chief to Refuse Nepali Request for Arun, IPS, Oct. 19, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD, ALLWLD file. After an l1-month investigation, and
just before the publication of the report by the Bank's inspection Panel, the President
of the Bank announced that the Bank "failed to observe in substance the policy re-
quirements of the Bank." Id.
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Arun Request for investigation. Finally, it will draw some conclusions
about the Panel process.
I. A DESCRIPTON OF THE PANEL
A. COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL
The Board established requirements for the Panelists" designed to
produce an independent, diverse, and competent Panel. The bank will
select panelists "on the basis of their ability to deal thoroughly and
fairly with the requests brought to them, their integrity and indepen-
dence from the Bank's management, and their exposure to developmen-
tal issues and to living conditions in developing countries."'" Each of
the three Panelists must be a citizen of a different World Bank member
country 3 and may not have worked for the World Bank for at least the
two years prior to their appointment to the Panel." Each member is
eligible to serve only one non-renewable five-year term of office.'
Panelists will be ineligible to work for the Bank after their term of
office expires.'6 During their term of office, Panel members can only
be removed from office "for cause."'
7
B. REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATION AND PANEL REVIEW
The Panel has the authority to receive and investigate requests for
investigation from any "affected party in the territory of the borrower
[country]."' 8 An "affected party" is any party "which is not a single
individual"' 9 whose rights or interests have been directly affected in the
course of a Bank operation.' The affected group's local representative,
or, in exceptional cases, a non-local representative may also file a re-
11. See Operating Procedures, supra note 2, at 4-5 (establishing a Panel for the
purpose of receiving requests from those adversely affected by Bank-financed pro-
jects).
12. Resolution, supra note I, 4.
13. Id. f 2.
14. Id. f5.
15. Id. 3.
16. Resolution, supra note 1, T1 8.
17. Id.
18. Id. 1 12.
19. Id; see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
this standard for eligibility to file requests for investigation),
20. Resolution, supra note 1, 12.
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quest for an investigation.2 Executive Directors may also initiate com-
plaintsY
Requests for investigation, which must be in writing, must allege that
the "rights or interests" of the affected party "have been or are likely to
be directly affected" by acts or omissions of the Bank that are inconsis-
tent with the Bank's "operational policies and procedures." These pol-
icies and procedures are defined to include the Bank's Operational Pol-
icies, Operational Directives, Bank Procedures, and similar policies and
procedures issued before these series of documents became effective.
They do not include Guidelines and Best Practices.24
The "operational policies and procedures" cover all aspects of the
Bank's operations including such issues as participation by non-govern-
mental actors in Bank operations, the Bank's treatment of indigenous
people, the treatment of people involuntarily resettled during the course
of Bank operations, and the procedures to be followed in conducting
environmental impact assessments.'
The request for investigation must also describe the harm suffered by,
or threatened to, the complainant because of the Bank's allegedly
wrongful action,26 and the attempts of the requester to communicate
with the Bank about the problem. 7
Once the Panel receives the request, it notifies the Board and the
President of the request.' The Bank Management then has twenty-one




24. The Bank revises the operating rules and procedures periodically. Prior to the
Operational Directives, the policies and procedures were expressed in a series of Op-
erational Management Statements. Some of these Operational Manual Statements were
in effect at the time of the design of the Arun III project. The Bank is presently
reviewing its Operational Directives and replacing them with three separate documents.
These are an Operational Policy, which establishes binding rules of policy for Bank
staff, Bank Procedures, which are statements that spell out the procedures that Bank
staff are required to follow in their work; and Good Practices, which are non-manda-
tory guidelines for Bank staff.
25. The Bank's policies and procedures are available through the Bank's Public
Information Center, 1818 H Street, N.W., Room GCI-300, Washington, DC 20433;
Tel: (202) 458-5454.
26. Resolution, supra note 1, T 16.
27. Id. 9113.
28. Operating Procedures, supra note 2, at 11.
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tends to comply with," the relevant policies and procedures. After re-
ceiving this response, the Panel has twenty-one days to determine if the
request satisfies the requirements of the Resolution and to make a rec-
ommendation to the Board of Direction as to whether there should be
an investigation of the issues raised in the request."
The issues that the Panel considers in its review of the request are:
(i) Is the request filed by "an affected party in the territory of the bor-
rower which is not a single individual"?3
(ii) Did the requester communicate with the Bank staff prior to filing the
request and did it receive an adequate response?"
(iii) Does the request state sufficient grounds to justify an investigation?
"Sufficient grounds" appear to exist if the requester alleges that its "rights
or interests have been or are likely to be directly affected by an action or
omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its
operational policies and procedures"'" and this failure caused or threatens
to cause a "material adverse effect" to the requester' Furthermore, re-
quests for investigation must relate to acts which are the exclusive re-
sponsibility of the Bank."
(iv) Is the violation of the Bank's policies and procedures of a "serious
character"?1
6
(iv) Does the request arise from the conduct of the Bank in the design,
appraisal or implementation phases of the project? The Panel may also
address the Bank's failure to "follow-up" on the borrower's obligations
under the loan agreement. The complaint, however, cannot relate to pro-
curement issues' or to loans which are substantially disbursed.'
29. Resolution, supra note 1, U 18.
30. Id. 19.
31. Id. I[ 12. The Panel, in its Operating Procedures, states that "any group of
two or more people in the country where the Bank financed project is located," can
file a request. Operating Procedures, supra note 2, art. II(A)(4)(a); see infra notes
109-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Bank and the Management's differing
interpretations of this issue).
32. Resolution, supra note 1, E 13, 16.
33. Id. [ 12.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Resolution, supra note 1, 13.
37. It should be noted that the restriction on procurement issues appears to be
directed at requests brought by suppliers of goods and services to Bank funded pro-
jects or by loosing bidders in procurement procedures. These complainants have other
means of recourse. The situation with other interested parties who feel they have suf-
fered harm as a result of procurement decisions is less clear. This issue has been
raised in the second request for investigation. See Rondonia Request, supra note 7.
38. Id. 9MI 12, 14. A loan may be considered to be substantially disbursed when
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C. PANEL RECOMMENDATION AND INVESTIGATION
Upon completion of this review, the Panel makes a recommendation
to the Board about whether the Board should authorize an investigation
of the issues raised in the request.39 The Board then decides whether to
accept or reject the recommendation. The Resolution establishing the
Panel (the Resolution) specifies that the Panel must distribute its rec-
ommendation to the Executive Directors "within the normal distribution
period,"' but does not specify the time period within which the Execu-
tive Directors must act on the Panel's recommendation. Nevertheless, the
requester must be informed of the Board's decision within two weeks of
the decision.4' The request, the Board's decision, and the Panel's rec-
ommendation are then made available to the public.42 The Resolution
does not state whether the Bank Management's response to the request
should be available to the public.43
The Panel conducts the investigation according to the terms estab-
lished by the Board." In the course of an investigation, the Panel has
access to all "pertinent" Bank staff, documents, and records." The Res-
olution does not specify the scope of the Panel's access to this informa-
tion or its ability to compel staff to provide information. At the end of
the investigation, the Panel must submit its findings and recommenda-
tions to the Board and the President.' Within six weeks of receiving
the report, the Bank Management submits its recommendation in re-
sponse to the Panel's findings to the Board.47
The Board then renders a final decision on the matter. There is no
specified time period within which the Board must make this decision.
95% of the funds are distributed. Id. I 14.
39. Id. 9 19.
40. Id. According to the Bank's General Council, the normal distribution period
is three weeks. Shihata, supra note 6, at 73 n.75.
41. Resolution, supra note 1, 1 19.
42. Id. 9125.
43. See Operating Procedures, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing the Bank
Management's response to notification of receipt of a request). The Procedures are
silent on whether Management's response should be made available to the public.
44. Id. at 17.
45. Resolution, supra note 1, 91 21.
46. Id. 91 22.
47. Id. 91 23.
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The Board then informs the requester of its decision.' The Board's
decision and the Panel's findings and report are made available to the
public within two weeks of the Board's decision."
In addition to its reports on each complaint and investigation, the
Panel must submit an annual report on its activities to the President and
the Board. This report must be made available to the public."
II. THE ARUN III HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT5'
The Arun III Hydroelectric Project (Arun ) contemplated the de-
velopment of a 122 kilometer access road through the Arun valley to
the proposed dam site;' and, construction of a 201 MNV hydroelectric
power scheme, including a 68 meter dam and 122 kilometers of trans-
mission lines." The project was to be the first phase of a 402 MW
power project. The total cost of the project was estimated to be US
$800 million.54 The International Development Association (IDA) pro-
posed to lend the Kingdom of Nepal US $136.1 million to finance this
project.55
IDA also proposed to restructure an existing credit, "The Arun I
Access Road Project," so that the funds available through this credit
could be used to build the 122 kilometer access road to the hydroelec-
tric project 6 The original purpose of this latter credit, which was ap-
proved by the Board in 1989, was to fund the construction of an access
road through the hills surrounding the Arun Valley to the future site of
the Arun damf This plan had been abandoned and the project
48. Id.
49. Resolution, supra note 1, 25.
50. Id. 26.
51. The Inspection Panel Report on Request for Inspection: Nepal: Proposed
Arun III Hydro-Electric Project and Restructuring of the Arun III Access Road





55. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51. The balance of the funds for
the Anm Il project would be provided by the Asian Development Bank, the
Kreditannstalt fur Wiederaufbau, the Government of France, the Swedish Agency for
International Technical and Economic Cooperation, the Finnish International Develop-
ment Agency, and other donors. These other agencies appear to have deferred to the
Bank in the design and structuring of the project.
56. Id.
57. Id. The borrower on this loan was the Kingdom of Nepal. The Inspection
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sponsors now planned to build the access road through the Arun Valley,
rather than through the surrounding hills.
In order to prepare for construction of the originally planned hill
road, the government of Nepal expropriated land and forced the resettle-
ment of a number of people on the project route.58 The borrower, how-
ever, never commenced construction of the hill road.59 Thus, although
the hill road project was abandoned, there were people who had been
adversely affected by the actions taken to prepare for the construction of
the hill road.'
The total cost of the Arun project would have had a significant im-
pact on Nepal's debt profile, and could have affected the amount of
funds available for other development projects.6 The project therefore
had important implications for the future development path of one of the
world's poorest countries. It also raised important questions about the
Bank's role and responsibility in funding infrastructure development.
Not surprisingly, the proposed Arun I project generated a great deal
of controversy in Nepal and around the world. Those supporting the
project contended that Nepal desperately needed new sources of ener-
gy62 and revenue.' Opponents to the project contended that the pro-
ject would not produce affordable electricity for the people of Nepal;
was so large and complex that it would crowd out other possible devel-
opment projects that would benefit the poor in Nepal more directly; and
would cause serious environmental problems.' In addition, the project's
Panel Investigation Report, Nepal: Arun III Proposed Hydroelectric Project and Re-
structuring of IDA Credit, 5 The Inspection Panel, World Bank Doe. Annex 1 (June
21, 1995) [hereinafter Panel Report].
58. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, at 18.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Letter from Arun Concerned Group to The World Bank Inspection Panel
(Oct. 24, 1994) (on file with the American University Journal of International Law
and Policy) [hereinafter ACG Letter]. The total cost of the project would have ex-
ceeded Nepal's annual budget. It is important to note that the project expenditures
would be spread over a number of years.
62. Only nine percent of Nepalese citizens have access to electricity. Nepal: Arun
III, Management Response to Request for Inspection, 2 World Bank Doe. (Nov. 21,
1994) [hereinafter Management Response].
63. ACG Letter, supra note 61. The initial design of the Arun HI project as-
sumed that Nepal would sell much of the power produced by the Arun III project to
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opponents claimed that cheaper and less damaging hydropower altema-
fives were available to Nepal.'
A. THE ARUN REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION
In October 1994, four citizens of Nepal, acting through the Arun
Concerned Group (ACG), requested the Panel to investigate the pro-
posed Arun I Hydroelectric Project.' The ACG filed the Request be-
fore the recently elected Government of Nepal had formally re-submitted
its Request for IDA funding for the project.' The Request for inspec-
tion was therefore filed before IDA formally decided to lend money to
the Arun project.
ACG claimed that the Bank, in planning and designing the Arun MI
project, failed to act in conformity with its operating rules and proce-
dures.' In particular, the requesters alleged that
(1) The Bank did not adequately study alternatives to the proposed project
and so had not fulfilled the basic criteria for project acceptability which
are set out in Operational Policy 10.04, regarding economic evaluation
of the Bank's investment operations;'
(2) The Bank did not meet all the requirements set out in Bank Proce-
dures 17.50,"' pertaining to the Project Information Document;'
(3) The Bank did not meet all the requirements set forth in Operational
Directive 4.01' for an adequate environmental impact assessment, in-
cluding the evaluation of alternatives, consultation with those affected by
65. Id.
66. Id. at 10.
67. The Government of Nepal was required to re-submit a request for funds to
IDA because IDA had conditionally responded to Nepal's initial request for funds.
IDA had informed Nepal that funds would only be available if it agreed to a stipulat-
ed increase in electricity tariffs for the energy generated by the project. The re-sub-
mission was required to indicate acceptance of this condition.
68. ACG Letter, supra note 61, at 2.
69. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL PoLicY 10.04: ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF INVEMENT OPERAIONS (1994).
70. ACG Letter, supra note 61, at 2.
71. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK PROCEDURES 17.50: DiscLosuRE OF OPER-
ATIONAL INFORMATION (1993). A Project Information Document which gives basic
information on the project is prepared for all planned Bank projects. It is a publicly
available document which can be obtained from the Public Information Center. See
supra note 25.
72. Request, supra note 8, at 4.
73. THE WORLD BANK, ThE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, Operational
Directive 4.01: Environmental Assessment (1991).
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the project, and the evaluation of the cumulative environmental impact of
all the planned phases of the project.74
(4) The Bank violated the requirements for determining adequate com-
pensation for involuntarily resettled people established in Operational
Directive 4.30," which discusses involuntary resettlement issues76
(5) The Bank failed to ensure that the project would provide some bene-
fits to indigenous communities in the project area as required by Opera-
tional Directive 4.20,' which deals with indigenous people."
Two of the four requesters lived in the project area. Both claimed to
have been directly and adversely affected by the hill access road project.
One of these two requesters complained of inadequate compensation for
land surrendered to the project.79 The other claimed that he lost title to
his land, but had not yet received compensation from the government.8"
Interestingly, these two requesters asked the Panel to keep their iden-
tities secret. They informed the Panel that they were concerned about
their safety if it became known that they had filed the Request.8 They
authorized the other two requesters to represent them before the Pan-
el.82 The Panel respected their request, and throughout the Arun In
proceedings, kept their identity secret from the Bank staff, the Executive
Directors, and the Nepalese government.
The other two requesters do not live in the project area, but claimed
that the scope of the proposed project was so extensive that it would
affect their interests as citizens of Nepal." They argued that the effect
of the project on the Nepalese economy would be to crowd out other
possible development projects and to create undue risks to the future of
Nepal. 4
74. Request, supra note 8, at 5.
75. THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, Operational
Directive 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement (June 1990) [hereinafter OD 4.30].
76. Request, supra note 8, at 6.
77. THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, Operational
Directive 4.20: Indigenous Peoples, 2 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter OD 4.20].
78. Request, supra note 8, at 7.
79. Request, supra note 8, at 101.
80. Id. The second requester still retained possession of his land because the
government of Nepal and the Bank suspended the hill access road project.
81. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, at 3.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Request, supra note 8, at 8.
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B. THE BANK RESPONSE
1. Applicable Bank Operating Rules and Procedures
The Bank Management did respond to the complaint within the requi-
site twenty-one days.' The Management disputed the allegations of the
ACG and contended that the Bank staff had acted in compliance with
the applicable operational policies and procedures.
An interesting issue the Bank Management's response raises is the
choice of the applicable operational policies and procedures. The Bank
Management contended that the Panel should evaluate the staffs perfor-
mance in terms of the rules in force at the time that the Bank undertook
the challenged action and not in terms of the rules currently in force.
The Management claimed that, in some instances, the operating rules
cited by the ACG were not the applicable rules in force at the time of
the alleged wrongful acts."
As a legal matter, this argument is persuasive. Prima facie, it does
not seem reasonable to hold the Bank staff to standards that did not
apply at the time of the challenged acts or omissions. The problem with
this argument is that these operating rules and procedures in effect prior
to 1993, when the Bank adopted its present information disclosure poli-
cy, may not be available to the public.' Therefore, if the Bank were to
adopt Management's argument, it would seriously weaken the ability of
potential requesters to seek investigations of projects that were initiated
prior to 1993. In order to successfully bring such a request, the potential
requester would need to ascertain the applicable operating rules at that
relevant time and be able to obtain copies of these rules.' The Bank's
85. Management Response, supra note 62, at 8.
86. Id. at 8; Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, Annex A.
87. Management Response, supra note 62, at 9 n.16.
88. To date, the World Bank has not applied its new information disclosure pol-
icy retroactively. This means that only those operational policies and procedures that
were in force at the time the new policy became effective are publicly available. THE
WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK POLICY ON DiscLosuRE OF INFORMATION (con-
taining the current policies on information disclosure).
89. While the problem is one that will presumably be resolved through the pas-
sage of time, it is a significant issue. The time that can lapse between the identifica-
tion of a project and the moment that the project loan becomes substantially disbursed
(and therefore outside the scope of the Panel's jurisdiction) can be as much as ten or
more years. WARREN C. BAUM & STOKES M. TOLBERT, INvEsTING IN DEVELOPmEN.-r
LESSONS OF WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE 580-84 (1985). Consequently, there are a sig-
nificant number of Bank projects which could potentially be the subject of requests
1996] 257
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argument therefore should not be determinative unless it is linked to a
more transparent Bank information disclosure policy. In the absence of
such a policy, the Bank staff should not be allowed to rely on secret
operating policies and procedures to avoid a Panel investigation.
Fortunately, the Bank Management did not premise its response on
this technicality. Instead, it sought to demonstrate that the Bank did
comply with the rules and procedures cited in the Arun Request.' Sig-
nificantly, the Panel, in its review of the complaint, relied in all critical
areas on the rules cited in the ACG Request.
2. Confidentiality of the Bank Response
A second important issue the Bank raised is whether its response is a
publicly disclosable document or not.9 The Bank Management insisted
that the Panel treat the response as confidential and not release it to the
ACG or the public. The Management's demand was technically con-
sistent with the Panel's procedures. The Resolution merely requires the
Bank to release to the public the request for investigation, the Panel's
recommendation, and the Board's decision.' It does not discuss the
Bank response and so cannot be construed as expressly requiring or
prohibiting release of the Bank's response."4 Furthermore, the Panel's
Operating Procedures provide that any party may request the Panel to
keep information confidential."
The Bank Management's insistence on the confidentiality of its re-
sponse gives two grounds for concern. First, it denies requesters access
to the Bank's response and an opportunity to address the issues raised
therein. Second, the Management's interest in keeping its response confi-
for inspection but for which the potential requesters may be unable to identify the
applicable operating policy or procedure and to obtain a copy of the policy or proce-
dure.
90. Management Response, supra note 62, at 6-8. The Bank Management, disput-
ed the ACG's claim regarding the Public Information Document (PID). Id. The Man-
agement argued that Annex A to Bank Procedure 10.00 (which discusses in more
detail than the information disclosure policy-Bank Procedure 17.50, what information
should be contained in a PID) was issued only after the release of the Arun III PID.
Id. Consequently, the Management contended, it was not applicable to the Arun situa-
tion. Id.
91. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, Annex A.
92. Id.
93. Resolution, supra note 1, 25.
94. Id.
95. Operating Procedures, supra note 2, 9I 63.
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dential was selective. The Management provided copies of its response
to the Executive Directors before the Panel completed its review of the
complaint. This meant that the Executive Directors did not receive the
Management's response from the Panel as envisaged by the Panel Proce-
dures. In addition, they received the Management Response before they
had formally received the Panel's recommendation or the Request. Since
the Executive Directors make the final decision on whether or not there
will be an investigation," the Management's actions amounted to an
extra-procedural attempt to influence the Board's decision on the Re-
quest for an investigation.
Executive Directors are officials of the Bank. Consequently, it is
possible for the Bank Management to contend that showing the Bank
response to the Executive Directors did not breach the confidentiality of
the response. It was merely sharing the information with other Bank
officials.
This argument, however, fails to recognize that by creating the Panel,
the Executive Directors, in effect, created a new role for themselves.
They are now the decision-makers in a procedure that is designed to
investigate the performance of Bank staff. Hence, since the creation of
the Panel, the Executive Directors act as both the directors of the Bank
and the final decision-makers in the Panel proceedings.'
In the Resolution, the Board established procedures to govern the
form of the communications between the Management and the Board
when they are acting in their capacity as decision-makers in the panel
process." These procedures do not provide for extra-procedural commu-
nications between the Board and the Bank Management and staff.'
C. RECOMMENDATION OF THE PANEL
The Panel based its recommendation to the Executive Directors on the
Request; the Bank response; additional information and clarifications that
the Panel sought from the Bank and the requesters; and the site visit
conducted by one of the Panelists.'" The Panel's Recommendation Re-
96. Id. at 16.
97. For discussion on the related issue of the role of the Legal Department in
the Panel Process, see infra notes 311-22 and accompanying text.
98. Resolution, supra note 1.
99. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text (discussing the propriety of ex
parte communications).
100. See Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, at 3 (describing the loca-
tion of the site). Mr. Richard Bissell conducted the site visit. Id.
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port reviews all the issues raised in the Request and the Management's
response, and provides a rationale for the Panel's recommendation to the
Board.'' In the Recommendation Report, the Panel recommends that
the Executive Directors authorize an investigation of the environmental,
indigenous people, and involuntary resettlement issues that the requesters
raised.'"
The Recommendation Report does not endorse an investigation of the
Bank's failure to comply with Operational Directive 10.04, regarding
economic analysis of the project."3 The Panel notes in the Recommen-
dation Report, however, that the allocation of attention and effort to the
assessment of numerous alternative project designs is a question of
judgment." Nevertheless, the Panel suggests that the Bank should
have conducted a more careful analysis of alternatives to the chosen
project. 5 The Panel, however, concluded that it would serve no useful
purpose for the Panel to duplicate the work already done by the Bank's
staff. 
06
1. Follow-Up to the Recommendation Report"
The Panel's Recommendation Report led to meetings between the
Panel and the Board, and the Panel and senior Bank staff. These meet-
ings generated a debate over who is eligible to file requests for inspec-
tion with the Panel. The Bank Management in its response to the Re-
quest did not challenge the eligibility of the ACG to file its Request.
Nevertheless, the Panel hints in its Recommendation Report that there
may be some grounds for concern in this regard.' 3 The Board howev-
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id.
104. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, at 3.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Id. at 6.
107. This section is based on discussions with people with detailed knowledge of
these meetings.
108. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, at 4. The Panel states that
"the serious nature of the substance of the Request as a whole and its timing in rela-
tion to the project process outweighed outright rejection of the Request on the
grounds of doubts about the standing of the requestors and incomplete compliance
with formal procedures." Id.
In this regard, it should be noted that the two requesters who lived in the
Arun Valley were differently affected by the Hill Road credit and the proposed Arun
Il project. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the
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er explicitly raised this issue.
The key question in these meetings was: does paragraph twelve in the
Resolution, which provides that the Panel shall receive requests for
inspection filed by "an affected party ... which is not a single individ-
ual (i.e., a community of persons such as an organization, association,
society or other group of individuals)"'"' mean that any two or more
affected people can file a request for investigation?
In order to resolve this issue, the Executive Directors requested a
legal opinion from the Bank's General Counsel."' The General Coun-
sel, in complying with the Request, provided the Board with an opinion
that discusses the requirements for eligibility in general terms, but does
not specifically address the Arun case.
2. General Counsel's Legal Opinion
In the opinion, the General Counsel argues that "a number of persons
each acting in his own, single capacity""' cannot submit a complaint.
Instead, he claims that only a group that has a "commonality of
interests""' is eligible to bring a request for investigation. The General
Counsel does not explain how to distinguish a group with a "commonal-
ity of interests" from one that is merely a collection of individuals, each
of whom is differently affected by the proposed or ongoing Bank pro-
ject, but who share a common interest in having the Panel investigate
the project in question. It appears, however, that the ACG requesters
complaints). One of the requesters actually had his land taken and received allegedly
inadequate compensation. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, at 3. The
other lost title to, but not possession of, his land. Id. He also did not receive any
compensation from the government of Nepal. Id. The other two requesters did not
live in the Arun Valley and claimed that the size of the project meant that it would
affect all Nepali citizens. Id. The impact of the project on these two requesters may
not be identical because of their physical location and life circumstances. Id. The
Panel appears to have viewed the first two claimants as representative of classes of
people affected by the project. As such, the Panel viewed these claimants as sharing
a commonality of interest with the class of potential claimants.
109. See Resolution, supra note 1, 91 12 (describing who may file a request for
inspection).
110. See Role of the Inspection Panel in the Preliminary Assessment of Whether
to Recommend Inspection: A Memorandum of the Senior Vice President and General
Counsel (Jan. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Shihata Legal Opinion] (copies available at the
World Bank's Public Information Center) (stating the legal opinion of Doctor Ibrahim
F.I. Shihata, General Counsel of the World Bank).
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id.
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would not meet this "commodity of interest" standard because the pro-
ject would have affected each individual complainant in a different
manner. Consequently, they cannot argue that they have a common
interest in the project which they are jointly seeking to protect in the
Panel process.
The General Counsel's opinion raises a number of concerns. First, the
opinion does not refer to the Panel's Operating Procedures or to
paragraph twenty-four of the Resolution which appears to authorize the
Panel to make decisions on procedural matters. In fact, it contradicts the
Panel's Operating Procedures which do not require the requesters to
demonstrate a community of interest. The Operating Procedures merely
stipulate that "any group of two or more people" may file a
complaint."'
Second, the effect of the General Counsel's opinion would be to limit
access to the Panel. If the Board adopts the General Counsel's advice
on this issue, it would not be sufficient for potential requesters to claim
that they have all been affected by the same project, albeit, in different
ways, and that they share a common interest in having the project inves-
tigated. Instead, complainants would need to demonstrate that they share
the requisite "commonality of interests," as defined by the Bank, and
that an act or omission of the Bank has, or is likely to, affect these
common interests.
Third, even if potential requesters are able to satisfy the "commonali-
ty of interests" standard, they will be hampered by the requirement that
they must communicate their concerns to Bank officials before they can
file a request for inspection." 4 This requirement suggests that the com-
mon interest of the group must have been conveyed to the Bank Staff
Management. To satisfy this requirement, the requesters would have to
possess sufficient resources and organizational capacity to be able to
identify their common interests and convey their shared concerns to the
Bank. The General Counsel's interpretation would therefore impose an
almost impossible burden on the many poor and uneducated"' people
113. See Operating Procedures, supra note 2, 91 4(a) (listing the persons who may
file a request). Interestingly, the General Counsel previously stated that the drafting
history of the Resolution shows that the Board decided to amend the draft Resolution
to exclude requests filed by certain individuals only to avoid the Panel receiving fre-
quent, frivolous requests that would cause unwarranted disruption of its work. Shihata,
supra note 6, at 56, 95-96.
114. See Resolution, supra note 1, 91 13 (explaining how the Panel must satisfy
itself before an inspection request is filed).
115. In this context, "uneducated" means "lacking in formal school education."
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who are directly affected by Bank operations.
In addition to its impact on people affected by the project, it is not
clear that the General Counsel's opinion serves the interests of the Bank.
A major benefit of the Panel is that it provides the Board with a mech-
anism for a timely and independent review of the Bank staff's acts or
omissions. This mechanism can function effectively only if persons with
meritorious requests for inspection are assured of easy access to the
Panel and timely investigation of the merits of their complaint. The
General Counsel's interpretation of the eligibility requirement threatens
to turn this mechanism into one that is characterized as much by techni-
cal arguments over procedure and jurisdiction as by an investigation of
the merits of the claim.
Evidence suggests that this may be occurring already. In all three
requests for inspection filed since the Arun Request, the Bank has chal-
lenged the eligibility of the requesters." 6 Additionally, the requesters
deemed it prudent to engage a lawyer to help prepare the Request in all
three cases. These developments threaten to place the Panel process
outside the reach of those who need it most.
D. THE BOARD DECISION
The Board of Executive Directors met on February 2, 1995, to con-
sider the Panel's recommendation of an investigation."7 At the meet-
ing, the Board adopted the Panel's recommendations and authorized the
Panel to investigate:
whether IDA's policies and procedures have been observed with respect
to environmental assessment, indigenous people and involuntary resettle-
ment, in terms of (1) the consistency of the determination of the road
alignment with Operational Directive 4.01 (Environmental Assessment);
(2) the consistency of the treatment of indigenous peoples, if any, with
OD [Operational Directive] 4.20 (Indigenous Peoples), and (3) consistency
of arrangements for compensating seriously affected families for land
acquired by Government with OD [Operational Directive] 4.30 (Involun-
116. The treatment of the second request to the Panel involving the Planafloro
project in Rondonia state in Brazil provides the most telling support for this observa-
tion. The Management response to this Request raised a series of complex technical
issues related to the eligibility of the requesters and the nature of the injury they
have suffered. See supra note 7; see also Tanzania Request, supra note 7; Ethiopia
Request, supra note 7.
117. World Bank Authorizes Inspection of Nepalese Project, WORLD BANK PRxSS
RELEAsS, Feb. 2, 1995.
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tary Resettlement). 8
The Board also instructed the Panel to determine, "taking into account
the complexities of the issues involved, ... whether the requirement of
the above-mentioned Operational Directives were observed in sub-
stance.""' 9
The Board's instruction regarding an examination of the staff's com-
pliance with the Operational Directives should be contrasted with its
observations on the eligibility issue. The Board suggests that the Panel
needs to establish clearly the eligibility of requesters and to observe
strictly the provisions of the Resolution.2 ° The Board, therefore, ap-
peared to adopt the advice of the General Counsel in this regard.
The Resolution of the Board, authorizing the investigation, instructs
the Panel to incorporate into its investigation information and studies
provided by the Government of Nepal, the Bank, and other co-finan-
ciers, "as well as any remedial measures agreed by Nepal and the
Bank . ... 2,
Finally, according to the Resolution, the Executive Directors note that
the Panel did not recommend an investigation of the economic altema-
tives to the Arun II project, as had been requested by the ACG.
The Resolution states that "[m]ost Directors accepted that alternatives
were sufficiently examined and the choice of the most appropriate alter-
native is ultimately a matter of judgement . . . ."" The careful word-
ing of the Resolution suggests that all the Directors did not share this
view and that some of the Directors may have been willing to authorize
an investigation of this issue.
E. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
In March 1995, the Government of Nepal formally requested IDA
funding for the Arun III project."4 At approximately the same time,
the Panel completed the first phase of its investigation. This phase con-




121. World Bank Authorizes Inspection of Nepalese Project, supra note 117.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Nepal Government Approves Controversial Dam Project (Japan Economic
Newswire). Mar. 3. 1995.
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desk study of the documents relevant to the project." In April 1995,
IDA announced that it would send a mission to review the Arun III pro-
ject." In light of this development, the Panel notified the Executive
Directors and the Bank President that it would delay its field investiga-
tion until after the IDA mission had completed its discussions with the
Government of Nepal." On May 23, 1995, the Bank Management
sent the Panel a memorandum discussing the findings and recommenda-
tions of the April 1995 mission." The memorandum mentions a num-
ber of proposed remedial measures that were designed to bring the pro-
ject into compliance with the relevant IDA policies.'"
Ill. THE PANEL'S INVESTIGATION
Following the receipt of the Bank Management's memorandum and
pursuant to the consent of the Government of Nepal, the Panel conduct-
ed a field investigation in late May 1995.'" The investigation's objec-
tives were to confirm the findings of the Panel's desk study and to
review the Bank Management's proposed remedial measures in terms of
the requirements of the relevant Operational Directives and the Execu-
tive Directors' resolution authorizing an investigation.' The Panel's
investigation included a visit to the project area and meetings with offi-
cials of the Government of Nepal, the requesters, representatives of other
aid agencies and non-governmental organizations, and thirteen public
meetings in towns and communities that would be affected by the pro-
posed project." Over one thousand people attended these meet-
ings.' In addition, the Panel interviewed "and exchanged views
with ... a wide range of people."'" It is therefore probable that the
Panel's final report rests on more extensive consultations with the peo-
125. The Inspection Panel Investigation Report: Nepal: Arun III Proposed Hydro-
electric Project and Restructuring of IDA Credit-2029-NEP, June 21, 1995, at 2





129. Investigation Report, supra note 125, at 2.
130. Id. Panel members Messrs. Richard E. Bissell and Alvaro Umaila Quesada
conducted the mission, which lasted from May 27, 1995, to June 1, 1995. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Investigation Report, supra note 125, at 2.
134. Id.
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ple that the project would most likely affect than any other Arun III
study undertaken by the Bank. Following this investigation, the Panel
issued its report to the Board on June 21, 1995. '35
Based on its investigation and on the recommendations of the April
1995 mission to Nepal, the Panel concludes that IDA is "moving to-
wards and intends to comply in substance" with the Operational Direc-
tives dealing with Environmental Impact Assessment, Involuntary Re-
settlement, and Indigenous Peoples.'36 The Panel, however, found prob-
lems with the Bank staff's compliance with specific aspects of each of
the applicable Operational Directives.'" The Panel's findings on each
of the ODs are discussed below.
A. OPERATIONAL DIRnCTIVE 4.01:
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Operational Directive 4.01 delineates factors that the Bank staff
should address in an environmental impact assessment.'38 Specifically,
a project environmental assessment should consider, inter alia, the fol-
lowing issues: direct and indirect environmental impacts; alternative
investment sites, technologies, and designs; preventive, mitigative, and
compensatory measures; and environmental management, training and
monitoring.'39 Additionally, an environmental mitigation or manage-
ment plan should incorporate preventive and compensatory measures.
In its Report, the Panel notes that the Arun I project did not follow
the comprehensive approach required by the Operational Directives.'"
Instead, it followed "a piece-meal approach that . . . did not fully com-
ply with OD [Operational Directive] 4.01." , ' The Panel bases its con-
clusion on two findings. First, the Panel found the Bank was willing to
proceed with the appraisal and negotiation of the Arun III project before
completion of the environmental assessment of the valley route for the
dam access road.' Second, the Panel expressed concern that the nec-
135. Id. at 1.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Investigation Report, supra note 125, at 5.
138. See Management Response, supra note 62, at 9 (describing the requirements
of Operational Directive 4.01); see also Panel Report, supra note 57, at 22 (listing
the proposed issues in a project specific environmental assessment).
139. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 22-23.
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essary institutional structures for monitoring the environmental impacts
of the project would not be in place before project implementation and
construction began.'
43
These two findings are significant. The former suggests that the Bank
was willing to lend to a project before it adequately accounted for the
environmental costs of the project. This creates the risk that the Bank
could have loaned money to a project that proves to be less economical-
ly and environmentally feasible than expected.
The Panel's Report indicates that this risk was not insubstantial. In
the course of its investigation, the Panel found that the Bank did not
pay sufficient attention to certain key environmental concerns in the
project, including forest conservation and management, and the risk of
natural catastrophic events such as flooding and road washouts.'" The
Panel reported that the IDA management addressed these issues after the
April 1995 mission."
The Panel also found that the project would require IDA (or some
other project financier) to provide contingency financing in the event
that some of these risks occurred.'" The Report, however, does not in-
dicate if, following the April 1995 mission, IDA management addressed
the issue of these contingency funds.'"
The finding regarding institutional structures suggests that the Bank
may be paying more attention to arranging loans than to ensuring imple-
mentation of sustainable high quality projects. While this raises an issue
about the Bank's modus operandi,' it is particularly pertinent in a
poor country with a history of problems in managing large and complex
projects.
149
The project implementation issue is significant in the case of Arun
because the Bank relied on a precedent-setting and complex Regional
Action Plan (RAP) to deal with the environmental and resettlement
impacts of the project." The purposes of the RAP included the fol-
143. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 25-27.
144. Id. at 31.
145. Id. at 30-31.
146. Id. at 33.
147. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 32-37.
148. See Willi A. WVapenhans et al., Report of the Portfolio Management Task
Force, The World Bank, July 1, 1992 (discussing the problems with the "loan approv-
al" culture in the Bank and the proposed remedies).
149. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Marsyangdi
project).
150. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 27, 35.
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lowing: to strengthen the Nepali government's administrative capacity to
deal with the rapid expansion in the number of people who will need to
be resettled as a result of this project; to implement a program to
strengthen government institutions; to undertake women's programs,
including education, and the development of micro-enterprises and co-
operatives; to undertake environmental conservation and research activi-
ties; to implement a program to preserve sacred sites, monuments and
folk heritage; and to take advantage of new economic opportunities.'
The Bank, in the Staff Appraisal Report, states that the RAP is "inte-
gral" to the Arun III project.'52
The Panel concluded that the RAP constitutes "an innovative ap-
proach . . which has the potential to become either a model for future
work or, if badly implemented, a serious weakness of the entire Arun
Ill project."'53 It added that the RAP remains "an extremely ambitious
undertaking," containing numerous specific measures to deal with a
variety of complex issues."' The Panel expressed "serious concern"
about the heavy burden placed on the RAP.' 5 It observed that IDA
lacked experience in overseeing such a plan, and that the borrower's
"widely recognized lack of institutional experience" would make imple-
mentation of this plan difficult.'56 The Panel also noted that RAP was
to be funded "almost exclusively" from resources provided by other do-
nors.'57 The Panel observed that this implies that "a major burden of
compliance with IDA policies falls on project components not financed
by IDA.'
58
Given the Bank's own view of the centrality of the RAP to the suc-
cess of the Arun III project, the Panel's findings regarding institutional
structures is surprising. It suggests that despite the Bank's professed
concern with environmental issues and its claim that the Arun II project
had been thoroughly appraised, the Bank failed to comply with its own
policies and procedures with regard to a critical component of the pro-
ject.
151. Id. at 28.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 35.
154. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 35.
155. Id. at 29.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 29.
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B. OPERATIONAL DmEcTvE 4.30:
INVOLUNTARY RESEITLEMENT
The Panel noted in its analysis of the resettlement issue that the poli-
cy context for this project is Operational Manual Statement 2.33 and not
Operational Directive 4.30, which was issued after IDA and the govern-
ment of Nepal reached agreement on the hill road credit."" It con-
cluded, however, that "in spirit and major substance, the Operational
Directive and OMS [Operational Manual Statement] were close to each
other.,'  Furthermore, the Panel indicated that at the applicable time,
the Bank Management knew of the requirements and attempted to meet
the standards of Operational Directive 4.30 in its handling of the reset-
tlement issue.'" Consequently, the Panel applies the standards of Oper-
ational Directive 4.30 in its investigation.' "
The Panel's investigation focuses primarily on IDA compliance with
Operational Directive 4.30 in the case of the IDA credit for the hill
access road." At the end of its investigation, the Panel concluded that
"IDA failed to observe in substance the policy requirements for supervi-
sion of resettlement and subsequently failed to enforce covenants in the
Credit Agreement."'' In its Report, the Panel also suggests that IDA
experienced problems in complying with Operational Directive 4.30 with
regard to planning the valley route for the access road."~ In order to
reach this finding, the Panel developed an interpretation of Operational
Directive 4.30 which challenges the Bank's and the Board's understand-
ing of specific aspects of the Operational Directive."
The Panel begins its analysis by identifying the following four criteria
159. Id. at 6. Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 2.33 constituted the Bank
Operational policy applicable to resettlement issues before Operational Directive 4.30
became effective. Id. Operational Directive 4.30 issued on June 29, 1990, and the
credit was signed in 1989. d
160. Id.
161. Id. at 9. The Panel observes that "[t]he Bank can take credit for having
applied the substance of OD 4.30 to the design of the road project when there would
have been legal shelter not to do so." Id. Interestingly, the Bank Management at-
tempts to argue in its submission to the Panel during the recommendation phase of
the proceedings that only OMS 2.33 is applicable to this project. See supra text ac-
companying notes 85-90 (discussing the Bank's response to the Request).
162. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 6.
163. Id. at 6-10.
164. Id. at 34.
165. Id. at 19-20.
166. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 21.
1996] 269
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
for determining compliance with Operational Directive 4.30:
[(1)] Does the project adequately recognize the range of economic, social
and environmental problems that will affect people displaced by the pro-
ject?
[(2)] Does the project deal with the "long term" nature of the hardship
and damage that the project may cause?
[(3)] Are the compensatory measures appropriate?
[(4)] Are the compensatory measures carefully planned and likely to be
carried out?67
The Panel notes that, in order to investigate the Bank's compliance with
Operational Directive 4.30, it needs to identify which people qualify for
the treatment that the Operational Directive prescribes.' The Panel's
discussion of this issue raises a number of interesting points. First, the
Panel addressed the size of the forced resettlement.69 Operational Di-
rective 4.30 establishes two different standards for compensation based
on the scale of the resettled population. 7 According to paragraph four
of the Operational Directive, "[w]here large scale population dis-
placement is unavoidable, a detailed resettlement plan, timetable and
budget are required.''. A footnote to the paragraph states that in cases
where "only a few people (e.g. about 100-200 individuals) are to be
relocated, appropriate compensation for assets, logistical support for
moving and a relocation grant may be the only requirements."'' Thus,
while the Operational Directive requires the Bank staff to ensure that the
borrower is planning to render compensation to all resettled people, it
requires the Bank staff to scrutinize the resettlement plan more carefully
in the case of a "large scale" resettlement." It also creates a higher
standard for an acceptable resettlement plan in the case of "large scale"
resettlements than in the case of relocations of a "few people."'
74
The Panel notes that some observers contend that the approximately
1000 families to be resettled in the Arun case are insignificant compared
167. Id. at 6.
168. Id. at 31.
169. Id. at 1-2.
170. OD 4.30, supra note 76.
171. Id. 4.
172. Id. 91 4 n.8.
173. Id. 914.
174. OD 4.30, supra note 76, 91 4. It should be noted that in both cases the OD
places the primary burden of developing the resettlement plan and establishes compen-
sation on the borrower. Id. T1 20.
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with the scale of resettlement in projects such as the Narmada dam pro-
ject. 5 The Panel concludes that the scale of resettlement in Arun easi-
ly exceeds a "few people" because in Operational Directive 4.30 there
are substantially more people being resettled in the project than the 100-
200 people described as a "few people."'1 6 Thus, the Panel applied the
higher standard applicable to "large scale" resettlements in its investiga-
tion of the Bank's compliance with paragraph four of the Operational
Directive."n
This decision of the Panel establishes a precedent which should guide
all Bank staff in the future implementation of Operational Directive
4.30. Consequently, unless the Bank or the Board takes an explicit
countermanding measure, the Bank staff should apply the "large scale"
resettlement standard to all resettlements involving more than two hun-
dred people.
The Bank's effort to convert all Operational Directives into Opera-
tional Policies, Bank Procedures and Good Practices will affect the
precedents set by the Panel under the Operational Directives."n Never-
theless, in the absence of a clear break in policy, the Panel's finding
should influence the interpretation of the new Operational Policy.
A second issue the Panel discussed is the Board's instruction to the
Panel to focus its investigation on the impact of the resettlement plan on
"seriously affected people."'" The Panel began its consideration with
the following observation: "[b]y specifying a focus on 'seriously affected
people' the Board has created a category that does not exist in OD
[Operational Directive] 4.30 and, indeed, is not addressed in the Bank's
current principal guide to the subject, Resettlement and Development
(1994)."'" The Panel refused to read a distinction between different
categories of affected people into the Operational Directives.' Rather,
it suggested that the Board's distinction is a compromise with the bor-
rower to limit the application of the policy to a minority of those losing
175. At least 100,000 people are expected to be forcibly resettled in the Narmada
Dam Project. See D. MoRSE & T. BERGER, SARDAR SAROVAR: THE REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEw (1992).
176. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 7.
177. Id. IDA, in fact, required a formal resettlement plan as part of the Arun Ell
project design. Id.
178. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
179. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 7-8.
180. Id. at 7.
181. Id.
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their land.' Thus, on this issue as well, the Panel engaged the Board
in a dialogue on the interpretation of the applicable Operational Direc-
tives and, in so doing, establishes a precedent which should help the
Bank staff to understand the nature of their responsibilities under Opera-
tional Directive 4.30.
A third specific "scope" issue the Panel considered is whether Opera-
tional Directive 4.30 requires the Bank to consider the project's specific
impact on women.' The Panel concludes that the Operational Direc-
tives does establish such a requirement.8 4 The Panel reasons that
women are a separate class of affected people who are often invisible to
monitors because the project's impact on them, occurs within the
household framework. 5 Consequently, the Panel concluded that an
adequate assessment of the resettlement plan must include an examina-
tion of the impact of the project on women.8 6 The Panel's investiga-
tion of this aspect discovered that "[i]n the context of the Arun projects,
only token attention is given to women."'8 7
The Panel's willingness to provide reasoned interpretations of the
language in the Operational Directives is an important development that,
if encouraged, should benefit all stakeholders in the Bank. It contributes
to a jurisprudence of the Bank's operating law and policies,' which
will help both the Bank staff and other Bank stakeholders to understand
the procedures and standards of conduct established by the Bank's oper-
ating rules and policies.8 9 This will improve both the transparency and
the accountability of the Bank's operations."9 In addition, the Panel's
interpretations will discourage any Bank efforts to implement the oper-
ating rules and procedures through ad hoc and unexplained interpreta-
tions of the Operational Directives.9
The next issue the Panel focused on was the problems the project
182. Id.
183. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 8-9.
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id. This conclusion is surprising in light of the Bank's often expressed con-
cern with gender issues.
186. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 8-9.
187. Id. at 8-9.
188. Bradlow, supra note 6, at 605-12.
189. Id. at 605-12; Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 6, at 404.
190. See IBRAHIM F. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SE-
LECTED ESSAYS (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio K. Parra eds., 1991) (discussing the
importance of accountability and transparency in good governance).
191. Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 6, at 403-06.
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causes for the affected people.'9 The Panel reports that IDA's April
1995 mission discovered families "seriously affected" by the access road
project who sought rehabilitation but did not receive assistance.'" The
inspectors noted that the uncertainties caused by the change in the ac-
cess road alignment adversely affected as many as 1400 families, includ-
ing the two people who filed the Request.'" The Panel predicts that
there may be more families adversely affected by the project."g In ad-
dition, the Panel asserts that "although necessary both for those dis-
placed and for a large portion of the Arun Valley population, provision
for access to jobs/training is not adequately addressed." '
The fourth issue the Panel addressed was the adequacy of the com-
pensation the borrower provides to the affected people." The Panel
criticized IDA for not paying adequate attention to this issue." It
pointed out that Bank experience with compensation for tribal or minori-
ty groups demonstrates that compensation purely in the form of money
is unsatisfactory."9 Such groups often need compensation that is in the
form of new land, jobs, and training. ° The Panel concluded that:
[firom virtually all writings, it was essential for IDA to insist on adequate
non-cash compensation... and yet when land was acquired on the Hill
route, the only compensation identified so far was cash-no land, no jobs,
and no training. The risk is that same tragedy could emerge in the valley
route as wellY '
Based on this report, one is forced to conclude that the risk of inade-
quate compensation is substantial. The project design calls for the Bank
to help the government increase its capacity to manage the rehabilitation
of displaced people "almost from the ground up."' After reviewing
192. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 34.
193. Id.
194. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 34.
195. Id. The mission found that the Government of Nepal compensated most of
the 1635 families who lost their land to the hill access road. Id. These families are
not the same as those referred to in the text. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 9-10.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 9-10.
201. Id. at 9.
202. Id. at 10. The Panel notes the serious deficiencies in the applicable legal
framework and the efforts of the Bank and the government of Nepal to draft ad hoc
guidelines to deal with this issue. Id. The government carefully drafted the guidelines
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the Bank and the borrower's efforts in this regard, the Panel expressed
concern about the Nepali Government's ability to develop this capacity
quickly enough to handle the problems the Arun m project could poten-
tially cause. 3
The Panel's concern does not seem unwarranted in light of the
Bank's and the borrower's experience in the Marsyangdi Hydro Electric
Project,' an IDA-funded dam project located in Nepal. 5 This pro-
ject, negotiated by the government of Nepal and IDA, was to construct
a 69 MW facility. It involved the resettlement of over 200 families who
were affected by the government's acquisition of their land."° Cove-
nants in the project loan agreement stipulate that the Government of
Nepal should adopt and implement a resettlement program satisfactory to
the Bank before a specified date.2" The Bank failed to enforce this
provision and the project was completed well in advance of implementa-
tion of the resettlement plan."8 In fact, while the Panel Report states
that a compensation plan was eventually developed, it does not state
whether the plan was ever adequately implemented."°
The relevance of the Marsyangdi experience should not be underesti-
mated. The 1994 Bank-wide review of resettlement refers to a Bank
decision "that the Bank will not finance any new project involving
resettlement for a borrowing agency that is not living up to its existing
commitment for resettlement in an ongoing project." 1' Unfortunately,
it does not appear that the Bank took this decision into account in the
Arun case.
The fifth issue the Panel considered was whether compensatory mea-
sures were well planned and likely to be implemented.21' The Panel
focused on the Bank staff's treatment of these issues in the context of
the appraisal and negotiation of the IDA credit for the hill access
to be inapplicable to other projects in Nepal. Id.
203. Id.
204. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 3-5.
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id. Pursuant to the meaning of Operational Directive 4.30, the project there-
fore involved a "large scale" resettlement. See OD 4.30, supra note 74, 4 n.8 (list-
ing the requirements for a "large scale" resettlement project).
207. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 3.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 5.
210. Id. at 3.
211. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 10-14.
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road."' The Panel notes that Operational Manual Statement 2.33 in
cases of displacement of a significant number of people,"3 required the
borrowing government to develop a resettlement plan by the time the
Bank appraises the project."4 Operational Manual Statement 2.33 es-
tablishes the following clear timetable for the development of the reset-
tlement plan:
(1) At the time of project identification, the magnitude and nature of
resettlement must be identified.2 " This should include a review of past
experience and the relevant legal framework.2 6
(2) Resettlement components of the project must be developed at the
same pace as the preparation of other project components!" The design
and schedule of the resettlement plan must be completed before the Bank
sends an appraisal mission to the borrower country so that the appraisal
mission can assess the various resettlement options."s
(3) A detailed resettlement plan must be completed "before the negotia-
tion of the project loan.""19
The Panel also found that Operational Manual Statement 2.33 estab-
lishes the following criteria that the plan must satisfy:
(1) The displaced people must be "afforded an opportunity to become
established and economically self-sustaining in the shortest possible peri-
od, at living standards that at least match those before resettlement."'
(2) The plan must provide resettled people with compensation which takes
into account the replacement value of their lost assets." According to
the Panel, Operational Manual Statement 2.33 utilizes a broad definition
of what assets deserve to be recognized in calculating compensation.
The Panel found that the Bank staff did not require the borrower to
follow the prescribed timetable in developing the resettlement plan in
212. Id. at 5-7.
213. This is true at least for projects which will displace as many people as Arun.
See Panel Report, supra note 57, at 7-8 (discussing the scale of the displacement
issue). Also see OD 4.30, supra note 76.
214. Id. at 6. Operational Directive 4.30 contains a similar requirement. Id.




219. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 10.
220. See id. at 10 (citing paragraph 18 of Operational Directive 4.30).
221. Id. at 13.
222. Id.
1996] 275
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
the case of the hill route.' Instead, "the careful steps laid out in
OMS [Operational Manual Statement] 2.33 were being telescoped into
the period between appraisal and negotiation."2"4 In fact, the Panel
concluded that IDA was eager to begin construction of the project, even
though the project sponsors "did not have a final road alignment, did
not know how many people would be displaced, and the government
had not begun drafting" the required resettlement plan.' Moreover,
the Panel found that, in IDA discussions of the resettlement plan, there
was no "citation of problems in the Marsyangdi project" ' 6 concurrent-
ly under construction."
The Panel also reported that the Management submitted the credit for
the hill road to the board before the borrower approved the agreement.
This suggests that the Bank staff exposed the Bank to the possibility of
approving a loan which the borrower could later reject. In addition, the
project submitted to the Board did not include an adequate plan to deal
with the indirect environmental and social effects of the projectY8 Pre-
sumably, the Bank's Statutory Committee,2 9 which must clear all loans
before they are submitted to the Board for approval, and the Bank's
Loan Committee," which authorizes all Bank appraisal missions, ap-
proved these deviations from Bank operating rules and policies.
The sixth issue the Panel addressed was the supervision of the pro-
223. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 10.
224. Id. at 11-12.
225. Id. at 11.
226. Id.
227. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 11. The significance of this later finding is
that the Bank previously decided that it would not finance any projects involving
resettlement for a borrower which did not live up to its existing commitments for
resettlement in a prior project. Id; see supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the Marsyangdi project).
228. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 14. In the same month that the Board ap-
proved the credit, the non-governmental organization hired to study the indirect effects
of the project was still discussing its Terms of Reference with the staff. Id.
229. THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, Bank Proce-
dure 10.00: Investment Lending: Identification to Board Presentation (Jan. 1995) [here-
inafter BP 10.00]. The Statutory Committee is established pursuant to Article V(7) of
the Articles of Agreement. The members of the committee are the Regional Vice
President, the General Counsel, and for each particular loan, a representative of the
borrower country.
230. See id. There is a general Bank Loan Committee and regional loan commit-
tees. The membership of the regional loan committee consists of the senior officials
of the regional office and a representative of the Legal Department.
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ject.' It notes that after credit approval and execution by the Board,
"[C]redit 2029-NEP [the hill road credit] was essentially forgotten, other
than the legal/financial questions of how to restructure it so the money
never disbursed could be devoted to the new, much larger Arun m
project." 2 The Panel concluded its discussion of this issue with the
following statement "[a]s the requesters had submitted to the Inspection
Panel, the resettlement issue on the Hill Route had suffered abuse by
neglect." '
With regard to the proposed valley route for the access road, the
Panel noted that under IDA policies, a draft program for compensating
involuntarily resettled people is required before project appraisal can
begin In this case, all potential donors to the Arun III project, in-
cluding IDA, undertook a joint mission to appraise the valley access
road before the borrower prepared a draft resettlement program that
satisfied the applicable requirements of Operational Directive 4.30.?
Following the mission, IDA put the borrower on notice that loan negoti-
ations could not take place until the borrower developed such a
plan.
23 6
IDA did not enforce this requirement. Senior management sought the
authorization of the Bank's Loan Committee to begin loan negotiations
that would include discussion of the level of compensation payable to
certain affected groups.? The Loan Committee acceded to this Re-
quest even though the Staff Appraisal Report stated that an acceptable
plan would be developed during negotiationsm
The negotiations did succeed in that they produced a mutually agree-
able compensation plan. Unfortunately, this plan did not withstand the
scrutiny of the April 1995 mission, which recommended that more work
should be done on the baseline data, cost, and budget of the plan before
presentation of the loan to the Board. 9
The Panel's findings regarding the Bank's non-compliance with the
231. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 15.
232. Id. at 16.
233. Id. at 18.
234. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing OMS 2.33 and
Operational Directive 4.30).
235. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 20-21.
236. Id. at 21.
237. Id.
238. Id. The loan negotiations began in June 1994. See id. at Attachment 1
(containing the "Agreed Minutes of Negotiations-Arun H" dated June 13-21, 1994).
239. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 21-22.
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requisite standards for development and implementation of an adequate
resettlement plan are troubling. They suggest that, at least in the case of
Nepal, the Panel uncovered a serious problem regarding the Bank's
ability to learn from its mistakes regarding resettlement issues. First,
IDA did not appear to treat its experiences in the Marsyangdi project as
relevant to the design of the hill access road credit. Second, it ignored
the lessons from the hill credit in the planning of the Arun III project.
The Panel concludes its investigation of this issue with the following
observation:
[i]t is worth noting that both the Operations Evaluation Department and
regional reviews of the Bank's experience with resettlement stress the
central importance of early attention to strengthening governmental capaci-
ty to manage such programs. The studies point out that monitoring by
IDA has been chronically inadequate despite consistent findings that over-
sight must be exercised constantly during implementation and beyond."l
Hopefully, the Bank will take the Panel's finding seriously and will
ensure that this problem in the Bank's operations in Nepal is corrected.
As can be seen from by the above discussion, many people stand to
suffer if the Bank fails to do so.
C. OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.20:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
Operational Directive 4.20 establishes the standards of conduct appli-
cable to the Bank's treatment of indigenous people."" The directive is
intended to ensure that indigenous people benefit from development
projects and that the Bank avoids or at least mitigates the potentially
adverse effects of these operations on indigenous people.242 The stan-
dards established by Operational Directive 4.20 apply to "indigenous
people," "indigenous ethnic minorities," and "tribal groups."243 Opera-
tional Directive 4.20 stipulates that these terms describe "social groups
with a social and cultural identity distinct from the dominant society that
makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the development pro-
cess."
244
The first issue the Panel addressed in the Report relates to the defini-
240. Id. at 35.
241. OD 4.20, supra note 78, 9 2.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. T 3.
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tion of "indigenous people" for the purposes of Operational Directive
4.30.V 45 Certain observers of Bank operations sought to dismiss the ap-
plicability of the Operational Directive to the Arun case on the grounds
that the ethnic groups in the area "do not fit the classic expectations as-
sociated with OD [Operational Directive] 4.30. '  According to the
Panel, these 'classic expectations' are that the Operational Directives
would apply only to "isolated tribal groups untouched by moderni-
ty.,,247
The Panel stated that, at least in the Arun case, this position is unten-
able, given that observers on the ground and in Bank Management
recognize that the larger purpose of Operational Directive 4.20 is:
[to] ensure that groups in the population chronically vulnerable to damage
from the development process, who can be identified by their ethnic affil-
iation, need special monitoring and programs. The fact that some of any
given ethnic group have achieved some degree of integration into main-
stream society does not discount the concerns of the majority of a given
ethnic group, whether labelled 'indigenous people' or not.!'
The Panel utilized this broad interpretation of "indigenous people" in
the Arun case. It stated that some of the ethnic groups in the Arun
region are prepared better than others to deal with changes in their
lives. Furthermore, the Panel noted that virtually the entire popula-
tion of the three districts affected by the project are very poor and
therefore occupy a highly vulnerable status."' The Panel added that
"[w]here there is a propensity for any disadvantage among particular
groups of people, it will be crucial for a working monitoring system to
pick up distress signals quickly, before communities disintegrate
",252
In the Arun case, the Panel proposed that the "sensible" approach
would be to ensure that adequate anthropological surveys with clear
measures of well-being are conducted well in advance of construc-
tion. This should be complimented by close monitoring of the rele-




249. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 31.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 32.
252. Id.
253. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 32.
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vant population groups during the progression of the projectY4 In ad-
dition, the project plan should include contingency plans to cope with
challenges as they emerge during the course of the project 55
The Panel investigation indicated that the Bank's treatment of indige-
nous people in Arun III did not satisfy the standards proposed by the
Panel. The Bank did not conduct adequate surveys of the vulnerable
population. 6 In addition, it did not develop effective monitoring pro-
cedures.57
It is unclear whether the Bank or the Board agrees with the Panel's
definition of "indigenous people." However, it is to be hoped that, the
Bank will adopt the Panel's suggestion that the standards of Operational
Directive 4.20 are applicable to all vulnerable ethnic minorities, regard-
less of whether they satisfy the criteria of a more technical definition of
"indigenous people." This approach would advance the purpose of Oper-
ational Directive 4.20, which is to mitigate the adverse impact of Bank-
funded projects on these groups. 8 The Panel's broad, pragmatic ap-
proach to determining which vulnerable population groups qualify for
special treatment may be applicable in other fora that deal with the
responsibility of others towards indigenous people.
D. POST-REPORT DEVELOPMENTS
After the Panel issued its report, the new President of the World
Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, asked Maurice Strong, the former Secretary
General of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, to conduct a separate review of the project. During the course of
his review, Strong consulted with the Panel. The Bank President, after
receiving both the Panel's and Strong's reports, decided to withdraw
IDA's offer to fund the Arun project. This decision effectively ended
the proposed Arun mH project. 9
The Bank, in announcing the President's decision, cited the following
reasons for withdrawing the offer: Nepal's lack of capacity to implement
the project; its inability to "substantially increase" the electricity rates
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 3, Annex 2 (listing recommendations for further actions in the
Arun M project).
257. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 3, Annex 2.
258. OD 4.20, supra note 78.
259. Other funding agencies would not fund the project without the World Bank's
participation.
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charged to its people; Nepal would be running "too large a risk" by
implementing this project because the project could cause cuts in spend-
ing in other social sectors such as health, and education; and the Bank's
failure to raise adequate funds from other sources for the project.
The Bank President added that:
the judgment made over a year ago came out in favor of the project.
Irrespective of whether that was the right or the wrong decision at the
time, I have concluded that under today's circumstances and with the
information at my disposal, the risks to Nepal were too great to justify
proceeding with the project.O '
The collapse of the project caused mixed emotions in Nepal, where
people realized that the country remains ill-prepared to meet its energy
needs. Both supporters and opponents of the project blamed the Govern-
ment of Nepal and the World Bank for this situation. They contended
that the Arun project had the effect of precluding Nepal from consider-
ing alternative hydroelectric projects.' This contention should be eval-
uated in light of the fact that the requesters asked the Panel to investi-
gate the Bank's consideration of alternatives to the Arun Ill project and
the concerns expressed by the Panel regarding the Bank's analysis of the
alternatives to the Arun project.
Numerous groups in Nepal, including the requesters in Arun Ell, are
beginning to explore alternative power projects. The World Bank has
announced that it will send a mission to Nepal to discuss alternate pow-
er projects with the Nepalese Government.'
One of the potential effects of the President's decision was to main-
tain the Panel report's confidentiality. The Resolution establishing the
Panel only requires the Bank to make the Panel report available to the
260. Bank, Nepal Seek Alternatives to Power Projects, WORLD BANK NEWS, Aug.
10, 1995 at 3 (available from the World Bank Joint Library) [hereinafter Bank, Nepal
Seek Alternatives]; see World Bank Says No to Nepal Power Project, Japan Economic
Newswire, Aug. 4, 1995 (reporting that the World Bank informed the Nepalese gov-
ernment that it failed to raise the funds for the project); see also Alver Carlson, Arun
Dam Reversal Poses Question on W. Bank's Role, Reuter Bus. Rep., Aug. 13, 1995;
Suman Pradhan, Nepal: What Now? Nepalis Ask After Arun Shock, Inter-Press Svc.,
Aug. 7, 1995; Pratap Chatajee, Environment: Greens Laud World Bank Move to Scrap
Dam Loan, Inter-Press Svc., Aug. 4, 1995.
261. See Bank, Nepal Seek Alternatives, supra note 260, at 3-4.
262. See Pradhan, supra note 260.
263. See Chatajee, supra note 260.
264. See Bank, Nepal Seek Alternatives, supra note 260, at 3.
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public within two weeks of the Board's consideration of the report."5
Fortunately, the Bank decided to release the Panel report to the public
despite the fact that the Board did not meet formally to consider the
Report.
It should be noted that many of the reasons cited for the Bank
President's decision are mentioned in the Arun Request." In this lim-
ited sense, the President's decision can be seen as a vindication of the
Request.
His decision can also be seen as a compliment to the Panel and its
work on the Arun claim. In his statement to the press announcing the
Bank's decision, the Bank President states:
[t]he public debate on this controversial project was valuable in that it
served to heighten the concerns of Bank staff about the risks faced by the
project. It also led to a review by the World Bank's Inspection Panel of
environmental and social aspects of the project with the result that mea-
sures to address these concerns were strengthened.267
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ARUN CASE
A number of conclusions about the operation of the World Bank's
Inspection Panel can be drawn from the discussion of the Arun case.
First, it demonstrates that the Panel can play a useful role in protecting
the interests of people who may be, or have been, harmed by the
Bank's operations. The Arun case also suggests that the Panel process,
if allowed to operate freely, will highlight weaknesses in Bank perfor-
mance, and thereby enhance the efficacy of Bank operations. Finally, it
suggests that the World Bank needs to clarify the respective rights and
responsibilities of the Panel, the Bank Management, and the Board of
Executive Directors during the different stages of the Panel process.
Each of these conclusions is discussed in more detail below.
A. THE PANEL'S BENEFIT TO PEOPLE WHO MAY
BE HARMED BY BANK OPERATIONS
The Panel proceedings ensured that the requesters' concerns relating
to the project received a fair hearing on the merits before IDA and the
265. Resolution, supra note 1, 91 23.
266. See Request, supra note 8, at 4 (listing alleged violations of Bank operational
policies and procedures).
267. Chatajee, supra note 260.
[VOL. 11:2282
A TEST CASE FOR THE WORLD BANK
borrower actually signed a loan agreement' z Thus, the investigation in
the Arun case occurred at a time when meaningful change in the project
was still possible.
There are a number of examples that demonstrate that the Request
was able to influence decisions regarding the Arun project. First, the
Executive Directors' decision to authorize an investigation of the Arun
project culminated in an IDA mission to Nepal, whose purpose, was,
inter alia, to examine many of the issues raised in the Request.' This
mission led IDA officials to propose design changes in the Arun pro-
jectY' These changes sought to improve the environmental impact of
the project, the compensation offered to involuntarily resettled people,
and the project's treatment of indigenous people."'
Second, the Request led to extensive consultation between the Panel
and project-affected people.' During the course of its investigation,
the Panel conducted a number of public meetings and consultations.'m
These meetings afforded affected people an opportunity to express their
views and concerns to Bank officials who report directly to the Bank's
most senior decision-makers. As a result, the Panel's Report is probably
based on broader consultation with the people affected by the project
than any other single Arun project document. The information learned
from this process should enhance the Bank's ability to design and im-
plement projects in Nepal that are responsive to the needs of those
people that the projects most directly affect.
The potential for the Panel to have a beneficial impact on future
Bank operations in Nepal is substantial. The Panel's Report draws at-
tention to certain problems in the Arun III project that are relevant to
future Bank operations in Nepal. For example, the Panel Report makes
clear that the Bank staff failed to access accurately the Nepalese
Government's capacity to manage a compensation program for resettled
268. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 1-2. In fact, the Board received detailed
information about the problematic aspects of the project while the Bank and the Nep-
alese government conducted negotiations of the terms of the Bank's participation in
the project. Id.
269. See id. at 22 (stating that after the April 1995 mission, Bank Management
required many remedial measures).
270. See id. at 33-37 (discussing the findings of the Panel after the April 1995
mission).
271. Id.
272. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 2.
273. See id. (stating that over 1000 people participated in the meetings with the
investigators).
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peopleY4 It also demonstrates that this is not the first time IDA staff
erred in this regard. 5 Now that this information is public knowledge,
the Bank officials can be expected to take the findings of the Panel
seriously. This should result in the Bank paying greater attention to the
Nepalese Government's institutional capacity to manage projects. Such a
change in Bank operating procedures in Nepal should result in improved
treatment of resettled people in future projects as well as better managed
projects."6
The Arun proceedings also demonstrate that even a request which
does not result in a Panel recommendation for investigation can serve a
useful purpose.' Since the Panel must make the Request available to
the public, 78 the mere filing of the Request will succeed in publicizing
the issues raised therein. In addition, given that the Board must review
the Panel's recommendation, the Request will succeed in bringing the
issues raised in the request to the attention of the Executive Directors.
A demonstration of the utility of a request which failed to result in
an investigation is the Panel's treatment of the issue of economic alter-
natives to Arun Im. The Panel recommended against investigation of the
ACG's allegation that the Bank's analysis of economic alternatives to
the chosen project design was inadequate. 9 Nevertheless, in its Re-
port, the Panel made clear that it was concerned about the adequacy of
the analysis of economic alternatives. 80 In its subsequent communica-
tions to the Board, the Panel continued to mention this issue.28" ' The
fact that ultimately the Bank cancelled the Arun project and is beginning
to investigate alternative hydropower projects in Nepal suggests that the
allegations of the ACG succeeded in stimulating both public and internal
Bank discussion of this issue.
Another contribution the Panel can make to avoiding undue injury to
project-affected people and to the environment relates to project imple-
mentation. Studies by the Bank and by other organizations suggest that
274. See id. at 34-35 (detailing the findings of the Panel and its analysis of invol-
untary resettlement in the Inspector's report).
275. Id.
276. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 35.
277. Operating Procedures, supra note 2, at 24-25. This observation is only ap-
plicable to requests which are actually registered by the Panel. Id.
278. Resolution, supra note I, $ 25.
279. See id. at 5-6 (recommending against a further study of alternative proposals).
280. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 7.
281. See id. (stating that the consideration of alternatives is one of the most im-
portant features of a proper project analysis).
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the Bank's failure to monitor the construction and management of pro-
jects adequately causes many of the adverse social and environmental
impacts experienced in Bank-funded projects.' In its report, the Panel
pointed to the inadequacy of the Bank's monitoring of the IDA hill
credit and suggested that more attention should be devoted to monitoring
issues in the Arun project.' Hopefully, the publication of this finding
will result in Bank officials being more diligent in monitoring future
Bank-funded projects in Nepal. It could also stimulate greater efforts by
the public to hold the Bank accountable for the quality of its project
monitoring.
B. PANEL'S ROLE IN PROMOTING THE
EFFICACY OF THE BANK
One of the potential benefits that the Panel offers the Bank is that the
information it gathers will enhance the efficacy of the Bank's operating
policies and procedures' The Panel's investigations and review of
requests for investigation should result in the collection of empirical data
on the way the Bank staff actually implements the Bank's operating
rules and procedures. The Panel's findings in this regard may help
educate Bank officials about their responsibilities in the various phases
of the project cycle. This information should help the Bank develop
more effective operating policies and procedures., Finally, it may
help promote the Bank's new operating policy, which encourages Bank
staff to be more concerned with the quality of the projects the Bank
funds than with the quantity of new Bank lending.'
The Arun case confirms that the Panel can provide this benefit to the
Bank. For example, the Panel investigation revealed that, at least in the
case of Nepal, the Bank staff adopted an inappropriately relaxed ap-
proach to their obligations to ensure that the borrower provided adequate
compensation for involuntarily resettled people' z The Panel found that
282. See, e.g, Wapenhans, supra note 148.
283. See Panel Report, supra note 57, at 3-4 (emphasizing the need for the IDA
to learn lessons from its experience under previous projects).
284. Bradlow, supra note 6, at 556.
285. See id. at 580 (stating how the Panel's process instructs the Bank's staff on
Bank policies and procedures).
286. Id. at 556. The Panel process may also indicate that the Bank would benefit
from more open rulemaking procedures. kd
287. THE WORLD BANK, GETING RESuLTs: THE VORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR
IMPROVING DEVELOPMiENT EFFEcrrVENEss (1993).
288. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 10-14. Similar observations can be made
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there were problems with the Nepali Government's compensation plan to
resettle people. It found that the plan which was eventually developed
did not adequately assess the borrower's administrative capacity to ad-
minister such a plan." 9 Furthermore, the Panel discovered that the
Bank had previously experienced problems with the Nepali
Government's ability to manage compensation plans for involuntarily
resettled people.' Nevertheless, in the Arun case the Bank waived the
requirement that resettlement plans be developed before Bank appraisal
missions."' These fmdings suggest that there is a problem either with
the Bank's enforcement of the Operational Directives or with the Bank
staff's understanding of the applicable operating rules and procedures.
Another example is that the Panel found deficiencies in the Bank's
implementation of the provisions of the Operational Directives applicable
to environmental impact assessments.2' These deficiencies include a
failure to consider certain environmental risks to the projece93 and a
failure to account fully for all contingencies in the project design.294
It is still too early to determine whether the Bank will use the find-
ings from the Panel's investigation to improve the Bank's operating
policies and procedures. 95 However, it would suggest a remarkable in-
ability of the Bank to learn from experience, if the Bank failed to make
about the Bank's economic analysis of the Arun Project. Id.
289. Id. In its recommendation of an investigation of Arun, the Panel suggested
that the Bank did not sufficiently assess alternatives to Arun III. Panel Recommenda-
tion Report, supra note 51, at 57. The Panel also concluded, however, that this was
an issue of judgment over which it does not have jurisdiction. Id. Nevertheless, based
on the evaluation of the Arun II project, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that if
the Bank paid more attention to the possible alternatives to the Arun III dam, it may
have selected a project design more consistent with the administrative capabilities and
environmental situation in Nepal.
290. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (describing the Marsyangdi
Project).
291. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 10. The Bank expressed a willingness to
conduct its appraisal of Arun II before the borrower developed an adequate compen-
sation plan. Id. It also entered into loan negotiations without a fully developed plan
being in place, contrary to the mandates of Operational Directive 4.30. Id. This was
contrary to this applicable ODS.
292. Panel Report, supra note 57, at 22. The Panel concludes that the IDA staff
did not use the comprehensive approach required by Operational Directive 4.01. Id.
293. Id. at 22-23.
294. See id. at 23-25 (disclosing the environmental disadvantages involved in
changing the road route).
295. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the Bank's Operating
Procedures).
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improvements in its procedures for planning and monitoring of projects
in Nepal29
C. THE LEGAL SIGNIFCANCE OF THE ARUN CASE
There are four aspects of the Arun case, described in more detail
below, which are of legal significance. The first demonstrates the impact
of the Panel's findings on the internal law, that is, the operating rules
and procedures, of the Bank. The second is the relevance of the Panel's
findings to international human rights and environmental law. The third
involves the development of a Panel jurisprudence. The fourth is the
potential implications of the Panel's findings for the Bank's loan agree-
ments.
The Panel, in its Recommendation Report, provided reasoned interpre-
tations of key aspects of the applicable Operational Directives in its
analysis of the Bank's treatment of resettled people and indigenous
people?' For example, the Panel criticized the Bank's proposed dis-
tinction between "seriously affected people" and "affected people."' It
also clarified how many people must be involuntarily resettled to war-
rant the higher standards of treatment established in Operational Direc-
tive 4.30. In addition, the Panel discussed the meaning of "indige-
nous people" in Operational Directive 4.20 and suggested that this term
should be interpreted pragmatically to ensure that Bank operations do
not result in undue injury to vulnerable people.'
The Panel's interpretations should provide guidance to Bank officials
and other Bank stakeholders on the requirements established by the
Bank's operational policies and procedures. These interpretations there-
fore contribute to the development of standards against which Bank staff
performance will be measured. Furthermore, because the Panel's inter-
296. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Marsyangdi
project and the treatment of resettlement issues in the Hill Credit and Arun projects).
297. Panel Recommendation Report, supra note 51, at 16-19. The role of the
Panel in interpreting the Bank's operating policies and procedures could increase as
the Bank converts its Operational Directives into Operational Policies.
298. See Panel Report, supra note 57, at 13, 34 (reporting the Panel's findings on
Operational Directive 4.30); see also supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing this case).
299. See Panel Report, supra note 57, at 7 (providing the number of persons re-
lating to population displacement).
300. See id. at 35 (suggesting an expanded category for indigenous people); see
also supra notes 248-58 and accompanying text (discussing this issue).
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pretations are public, neither the Board nor Bank Management will find
it easy to reject the Panel's interpretation without providing some ratio-
nale for their decision.
The Panel's interpretations of the Operational Directives are also rele-
vant to international environmental and human rights law. The Panel's
reasoned interpretation of these issues can influence our understanding of
the responsibilities of all international organizations in this regard. It
could also illuminate the extent to which international law is incorporat-
ed into the operating rules and procedures of international organizations
such as the Bank."°
It is important to note that the Panel's well-reasoned recommendation
and investigation report make it possible for interested parties to under-
stand the rationale for the Panel's findings and its recommendation that
the Board authorize an investigation. If the Panel continues this practice,
it will develop a Panel jurisprudence that will make it easier for poten-
tial requesters to assess their chances of filing a successful request for
investigation.
Finally, the work of the Panel may contribute to the negotiation and
drafting of Bank loan agreements. In the course of its investigation, the
Panel discussed the difficulty IDA experienced enforcing some of the
covenants of the Hill Credit. This observation" may stimulate discus-
sion in the Bank and the broader legal community on the nature of the
conditions the Bank imposes on its borrowers. This could ultimately
result in improved loan agreements. It could also lead to a reduction in
the number of conditions that the Bank imposes on the borrower but
which the Bank, in fact, is unable or unwilling to enforce.
D. IMPROVING PANEL PROCEDURES
The Arun case suggests that problems persist in the implementation of
the Panel process. The primary problem relates to differing perspectives
on the respective responsibilities of the Panel, the Bank Management,
and the Board during the Panel process. 3" The Resolution establishing
the Panel makes clear that the Panel is independent of Bank Manage-
ment and that "it reports directly to the Board, which is the final deci-
301. See Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 6, at 406-11 (noting the
Panel's impact on international organizations).
302. See Panel Report, supra note 57, at 19-22 (discussing the problems arising in
changing the road route).
303. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Bank's narrow
interpretation of the requirements for eligibility to file a request for inspection).
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sion maker at all stages of the Panel process." This suggests that the
creation of a distinct Panel mechanism creates a new role for the Board
of Executive Directors. In addition to their role as the Directors of the
Bank, the Executive Directors now act as the final decision-makers in a
separate and independent investigative mechanism.
The creation of the Panel also should affect the Management's rela-
tionship to the Board. Since the purpose of the Panel is to investigate
allegedly harmful acts and omissions of the Bank staff, the Management
is an interested party in all Panel proceedings. This suggests that in
order to protect the integrity of the Panel proceedings, Bank Manage-
ment should only communicate with the Board regarding cases before
the Panel according to the rules stipulated in the Panel's Operating Pro-
cedures.
Any ex parte communications between the Board and the Bank Man-
agement call into question the transparency and the independence of the
Panel proceedings. In addition, because the Panel procedures do not
provide for such ex parte communications,3' these communications
threaten to undermine public confidence in the fairness of the Board's
decisions regarding the recommendations and findings of the Panel. The
reason is that once it appears that there might have been ex parte com-
munications, the requester cannot be sure if the Board based its decision
on the impartial recommendations of the Panel or on the interested
advice of the Bank Management. These issues are discussed in more
detail below.
1. Transparency of the Panel Proceedings
The Panel's Operating Procedures, which are based on the Resolution,
establish a process for review of requests for inspection.' The Operat-
ing Procedures stipulate that the Panel should communicate directly, and
without interference, with the Board of Directors. The Operating
Procedures and the Resolution also clearly define when Bank Manage-
304. Resolution, supra note 1, 9M 16-23. The only exception to this general princi-
ple is the Panel's authority to develop its own operating procedures. See Operating
Procedures, supra note 2, at 4 (stating the authority of the Panel derives from the
Resolution).
305. See Operating Procedures, supra note 2, at 13-15 (describing the manner in
which the Panel and Bank Management interact).
306. See id. at 7-20 (detailing the Panel review process from registration of re-
quests to the submission for Board approval).
307. Id. 9(H 38, 39.
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ment can intervene in these communications. The Operating Procedures
expressly provide that after the Panel submits the findings from its
investigation to the Board, the Bank Management has six weeks to
provide its own report on the findings to the Board."' Neither the Op-
erating Procedures nor the Resolution, however, grant the Bank Manage-
ment the right to initiate ex parte communications with the Board before
the Board decides to authorize an investigation.
Three reasons support limiting the Bank Management's ability to
engage in ex parte discussions with the Board about the Request for an
inspection. First, the Panel process is designed to ensure that the Board,
which in most cases will have very little prior knowledge about the
specific matters raised in the Request, will make a determination of
whether to authorize an investigation on the basis of their own indepen-
dent review of the Request, the Bank's response, and the Panel's recom-
mendation. If the Bank Management, which is an interested party in the
matter under review, engages in ex parte communications before the
Board receives the Panel's recommendation and the Request, it will un-
dermine the ability of the Board to reach its decision independently.
Second, the lack of transparency inherent in ex parte communications
between the Bank Management and the Board undermines public confi-
dence in the Panel process. The requesters are not able to ascertain what
was discussed in these communications and therefore cannot know if the
Bank Management is raising issues or making arguments which require
their response. Consequently, the knowledge that such communications
have occurred means that requesters can never be absolutely confident
that their request will receive the independent hearing that the Resolu-
tion promises.'
Finally, the fact that the Bank Management can engage in direct
communications with the Board on a request threatens the utility of the
Panel. The Panel provides the Bank with an opportunity for an indepen-
dent and timely review of issues that adversely affect the efficacy of
Bank operations and the interests of the intended beneficiaries. The
Bank can receive this benefit only if it fully respects the Panel's direct
and independent relationship with the Board."'1 This means that on all
matters pertaining to requests for investigation, the Bank Management
should ensure that its communications with the Bank and the Panel
308. Id. % 54.
309. See Bradlow, supra note 6, at 591-92 (discussing the dangers of ex parte
communications between the Bank Management and the Board).
310. See id. at 574 (describing the Panel's independence from the Bank).
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strictly conform to the procedures established in the Resolution and in
the Panel's Operating Procedures.
2. The Role of Bank Management
The new dynamic in the Board-Bank Management relationship created
by the establishment of the Panel requires that, to the greatest extent
possible, the Board and the Management should maintain an arms-length
relationship with regard to cases before the Panel. This suggests that all
direct communications between the Board and Bank Management re-
garding Panel matters must be transparent and according to the requisite
procedures.
The rationale for requiring transparency in Board-Bank Management
communications relating to Panel matters is obvious. The Bank Manage-
ment is involved in approving all decisions related to Bank operations.
Consequently, the Management's decisions are at issue in all Panel
proceedings. The Management, therefore, faces a clear conflict of inter-
est if it is able to advise the Board on these proceedings. An example
of the difficulties created by allowing Bank Management to engage in
direct and non-public communications with the Board on Panel matters
emerges from an examination of the situation of the Legal Depart-
mn311ment.l
The Legal Department is required to review and comment on all pre-
appraisal packages" Hence, a project cannot progress to the appraisal
stage without the Legal Department having reviewed and, presumably,
having determined that the Bank staff complied with all applicable oper-
ational policies and procedures. The relevant lawyers also must approve
a letter sent to the Government/Borrower confirming the findings or rec-
ommendations included in the aide-memoir drafted at the conclusion of
the appraisal mission" The Legal Department also participates in the
loan negotiations, and in the preparation of the Staff Appraisal
Repor 14 and the Memorandum and Recommendation of the Presi-
311. The author does not intend to suggest that the Legal Department's problems
are different from those of other Bank departments. The regional departments face
similar situations. The Legal Department is used as an example because of its specific
interest to a legal audience.
312. See BP 10.00, supra note 229 (describing the project cycle). This package is
submitted to the Regional Vice President and the General Counsel as well. Id.
313. Id. The aide-memoir summarizes the main findings of the mission, the under-
standing reached with the borrower, and the actions to be completed by the borrower
and the Bank, including schedules for these actions. Id
314. BP 10.00, supra note 229. The Staff Appraisal Report is the report that the
19961
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dent.315 The lawyers in the Legal Department also help to prepare the
report for submission to the Statutory Committee, on which the Legal
Department is represented.316 In this regard it should also be noted that
the Bank's General Counsel, who is also a Senior Vice-President of the
Bank, is a part of the Bank's Management.
The Legal Department's close involvement in the Bank's operations
makes it particularly well-suited to advise the Bank Management on
how to respond to a request for inspection. However, it would seem to
preclude the Legal Department from providing legal advice to the Board
on any issue pertaining to the Panel in general or to any particular
Panel proceeding. With regard to matters related to the Panel, the Legal
Department's advice to the Board, at least from the perspective of the
requester and other outside observers, has the appearance of a conflict of
interest. The conflict arises because the Legal Department is providing
advice to the decision-maker about a matter in which some of the issues
to be determined by the decision-maker are likely to relate to the Legal
Department's prior advice to Bank Management and staff or to decisions
in which the Legal Department participated.
The Arun case provides a good illustration of the problems that can
arise when the Legal Department seeks to advise the Bank staff and the
Board. First, during the appraisal and negotiation of the Arun II project,
the Bank, presumably with the consent of the Legal Department," 7
waived the condition that a compensation plan for resettled people be in
staff prepares following the appraisal mission. Id. It contains the Staffs analysis of
the project and is part of the record on which the Board bases its decision to lend
money to the project. Id.
315. Id. The Memorandum and Recommendation of the President is a memoran-
dum from the President to the Board. Id. In this Memorandum the President describes
the project, the proposed loan agreement, and makes his recommendation on whether
the Board should approve the proposed loan agreement. Id.
316. Id. The Statutory Committee is established pursuant to Art. V(7) of the Arti-
cles of Agreement. The members of this committee are the General Counsel of the
Bank, the applicable Regional Vice President and an expert appointed by the borrow-
ing country's governor. Pursuant to Article Ill(4)(iii), the Bank cannot loan money to
any borrower unless the Statutory Committee "has submitted a written report recom-
mending the project after a careful study of the merits of the proposal." Presumably,
the Statutory Committee considers whether the Bank complied with all applicable
operational policies and procedures.
317. This conclusion follows from the fact that the Legal Department is involved
in the decision to approve the appraisal mission. See supra notes 313-14 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Legal Department's involvement in the appraisal process).
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place before the Bank sent an appraisal mission to Nepal3 8 Similarly,
and contrary to the provisions of the applicable operational policies, the
Bank initiated negotiations of the Arun III loan before the compensation
plan was fully developed." The Legal Department participated in
these negotiations and thus, presumably, acquiesced in this decision. The
Panel's Report explicitly criticizes these actions."
Second, the Board asked the General Counsel to provide it with an
opinion on the standards for eligibility to bring a requests for inspection.
Regardless of the merits of the General Counsel's opinion, the involve-
ment of the Legal Department in the Arun I project means that the
opinion has the appearance of being the opinion of an interested party.
This is particularly pertinent because the opinion makes it harder for
outsiders to seek investigations of the decisions of the Legal Depart-
ment?
2
A number of possible solutions exist to resolve this problem. First,
the Board could eliminate the necessity of a Board review of the Panel's
recommendation of an investigation. If the Panel possessed the authority
to decide unilaterally when to conduct investigations, the Bank Manage-
ment would have less of an incentive to engage in ex parte communica-
tions with the Board. The reason is that a substantial number of the ex
parte communications between the Bank Management and the Board
relate to the review stage of the Panel process. A second possibility is
for the Board to establish procedures for Bank Management communica-
tions with the Board on Panel-related matters.' These rules should be
public and should provide that the requesters receive notification of
these communications and an opportunity to respond to the issues raised
therein.
A third possibility is to establish a presumption that the Board will
endorse all Panel findings unless it specifically rejects them within a
specified period of time. If it does reject them it should do so in a
statement that fully explains its reasons for rejecting the Panel's recom-
318. OD 4.30, supra note 76.
319. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text (noting that the Legal De-
partment is involved in the decision to initiate negotiations and in the actual negotia-
tions).
320. See Panel Report, supra note 57, at 9-13 (documenting the Bank's waiving
of the compensation plan).
321. See supra notes 312-22 and accompanying text (discussing the proper rela-
tionship between the Panel and the Legal Department).
322. Panel Operating Procedures paragraphs 37, 62, and paragraph 15 are relevant
in this regard.
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mendations.
CONCLUSION
The Panel is an important development for the Bank. The Arun case
indicates that the Panel offers project-affected people a means for ob-
taining an independent and impartial investigation of their concerns
about the project. It also demonstrates that the Panel is capable of help-
ing the Bank resolve difficult operational problems. Finally, the Arun
case suggests that the Panel's reasoned findings and recommendations
are likely to have an influence on the Bank's operational rules and pro-
cedures and may influence the development of international law.
The legal issues that the Panel addresses include such procedural
issues as eligibility to file requests for investigation, the relationship
between the Bank Management and the Executive Directors, the inter-
pretation of the Bank's operational rules and procedures, and such sub-
stantive law issues as the obligations of international organizations to
indigenous people, and the adequacy of environmental impact assess-
ments.
The Arun case also suggests that the Panel process creates certain
problems for the Bank. These problems arise from the Board's dual role
as directors of the Bank and as final decision makers in an independent
inspection process. If the Bank does not adequately address these prob-
lems, they threaten to impair the transparency of the Panel's process and
undermine public confidence in its impartiality and independence. Final-
ly, the Arun case suggests that these problems can be resolved through
changes in the Resolution establishing the Panel. These amendments
should be considered during the course of the forthcoming Board review
of the Panel.
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